• Uncategorized

    A Conflict of Visions – Sincerity

    I just finished reading Thomas Sowell’s classic work on ideologies, A Conflict of Visions.  I enjoyed it, but much less than his more vivid and prescriptive Knowledge and DecisionsConflict is the most conservative book that I have read in a while, and a couple of its arguments bothered me.

    Sowell’s overarching argument is that some people have an “unconstrained” vision that individual rationality can be used to solve and remove societal problems, while others hold a “constrained” view that rejects the mental capacity of any person or group to consciously reshape society.  People with the constrained view argue that we must trust neutral, systemic processes (the market, traditions, the common law, etc.), while those with these unconstrained view want to reshape these unthinking processes and substitute something more intentionally rational and forward looking.

    In a short section of the book, Sowell suggests that the different views lead to different conceptions of civic virtue.  People in the unconstrained view value “sincerity”; the constrained view values “fidelity”.

    Where the wise and conscientious individual is conceived to be competent to shape socially beneficial outcomes directly, then his sincerity and dedication to the common good are crucial….

    What is morally central to the constrained vision is fidelity to duty in one’s role in life.  There, within the sphere of his competence, the individual can make the greatest contribution to the social good by serving the great systemic process which decides the actual outcomes. [P. 56]

    Sowell argues that the importance of sincerity to unconstrained idealists makes it difficult for them to acknowledge it in their opponents.  To do so would undermine their belief that rational thought produces definitive solutions to social problems.

    It is not uncommon in this tradition to find references to their adversaries’ “real” reasons, which must be “unmasked”….  Within the unconstrained vision, sincerity is a great concession to make, while those with the constrained vision can more readily make that concession, since it means so much less to them. [P. 57]

    A few pages later, he scraps the obvious definition of sincerity (truthfulness) for one that seems to mean “good intentions”.

    The constrained vision in particular distinguishes sincerity from fidelity to truth:  “The first thing a man will do for his ideals is lie,” according to J. A. Schumpeter….  A modern defense of judicial activism by Alexander Bickel clearly put more weight on sincerity than on fidelity, when it urged that “dissimulation” was “unavoidable” and referred to “statesmanlike deviousness” in the public interest.” [PP. 58-59]

    Sowell is, of course, part of the constrained tradition.  And by shifting definitions he seems to be trying to have it both ways.  First, he accuses those in the unconstrained vision, unlike those in the constrained vision, of being unwilling to take constrained arguments at face value.  Then, he suggests that unconstrained arguments cannot necessarily be taken at face value.

    Sowell’s claim is interesting, and, the last part aside, it does strike me as more than a little bit true.  The progressives I read – Matthew Yglesias, Brad DeLong, Jonathan Chait, and Andrew Sullivan – all seem more personally condescending and critical of their ideological opponents than the libertarians in my blogroll – Megan McArdle, Arnold Kling, Bryan Caplan, and Tyler Cowen.  Progressives don’t just accuse their opponents of lying, but, more often, of being idiots.  I think this fits into Sowell’s main theme.  If rationality yields definitive answers to social problems, unconstrained idealists will explain away opposition as simple irrationality.

    But the contradiction in Sowell’s argument is a good reminder that we tend to see every possible flaw in our opponents.  It is difficult to draw strong conclusions from the anecdote in ones blogroll.  It is hard enough to just interpret that anecdote: confirmation bias looms large.  Is Matthew Yglesias really more condescending than Megan McArdle (Yes!), or do I enjoy Megan’s condescension more (Yes.)?  You don’t have to search Hit & Run too hard to find ridicule poured over progressives.  Ideological sketches like Sowell’s are unlikely to be drawn in anything but heavily interpreted anecdote, so they must be drawn carefully.

  • Beware of Specialists

    Beware of Specialists – Sowell

    I just finished reading Sowell’s Knowledge and Decisions and thought I should transcribe one of his critiques of expertise for this series.  It’s difficult to decide what part of the book to offer, as one of the book’s main two themes is a criticism of “rule by experts”.  Three fourths of the last eighty-page chapter constitute a sustained blistering criticism of the political contributions of “intellectuals”.  But I think the heavily abridged selection below from pages 102-104 presents a coherent (and less polemical) version of his argument.

    Sowell contrasts different decision making processes.  He calls the process of intellectuals “articulation” – linguistic elaboration of premises and logical conclusions.  Social and economic processes, on the other hand, may be completely unarticulated, in that no particular individual may be able to explain why they are beneficial.  Nonetheless, through price (and other feedback) systems they effectively convey objective knowledge about costs and preferences, despite their silence on the exact source of this information.

    Given the imperfections of language and the limitations of specific evidence, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that the mere formally logical articulation is in fact more rational, much less empirically correct  When the choice between the two processes is not within one individual but between one individual and another (or between one group and another), it is even less likely that the more articulate position  is the more valid position.  This is not an argument for mysticism rather than logic.  It is simply a recognition that the weight of generalized but unrecorded experience – of the individual or of the culture – may be greater than the weight of other experience which happens to have been written down and spelled out….

    When culture is conceived of as an evolutionary product – an ecology of human relations – it is by no means clear that any and all well-articulated reasons for changing particular parts of this social ecology must be valid.  Even if plausible in the specific case, a policy’s unintended consequences throughout a complex system is a weighty consideration.  Articulated rationality can seldom predict very far or very specifically, and much depends on the speed and accuracy of social feedback mechanisms – and on whether the feedback includes incentives to adjust or abandon counterproductive policies….

    In short, the Darwinian “natural selection” principle may mean a natural selection of the “fittest” situation or process, not necessarily individuals.  The degree of rationality in the process is by no means limited to the degree of rationality of the individuals, as is often erroneously claimed.  Rather, “mankind has achieved things which have not been designed or understood by any individual,” though their value has been retrospectively authenticated by millions who could judge the results without being able to judge – much less design – the process.